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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A. 
MADSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RECEIVE J 
Case |No. 1 4 5 ^ W Elm</\ ; : f 
1 3 JUN1977 
BRIGHAM YOUNG broVaOt.Y 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
Pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), Ut^h Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, respondent submits the attached pages of newly un-
covered cases for insertion in the brie| of respondent, all 
cases applying to Point III of respondent's brief. 
DATED this /) day of November, 1976. 
MOYLE & DRAPER— ,-> 
J Joseph J. Palmer 
Attorneys for Respondent 
600 peseret Plaza 
Salt|Lake City, Utah 84111 
F I L E D 
NOV 5 " 19'6 
Clerk, Supreme Court, 
- 43a -
Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz., 
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"), supersedes the 
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals Jin Brooks v. Valley 
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brooks I"), cited at 
page 31 of respondent's brief. Brooks III sustained the 
Superior Court's granting of motion to dismiss the action, 
as did Brooks I, holding: (a) a trust Was not created for 
the impounded funds even though the worqs "in trust" were 
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not 
unjustly enriched through use of the funds. The reasoning 
follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief. 
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasoned that a trust 
i 
was created because the bank received the funds to be applied 
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of 
the complaint was still proper, saying: 
Brooks relies on the general rule of law 
that it is the duty of a trustee to pro-
tect the interests of the beneficiary of 
a trust by the exercise of reasonable 
care and diligence in the management of 
the trust property, Bulla v. valley Na-
tional Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308 
P.2d 932 (1957), and the genetal rule that 
that trustee has a duty to invest the 
trust property so that it is made produc-
tive for the beneficiary. Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (195P). Where, 
however, a rule of law might btherwise 
be applicable to an agreement, custom or 
usage may make such rule of ljaw inappli-
cable. Williston, Law of Contracts, 
§648 (3rd ed. 1961). 
- 43b -
The practice of requiring impound 
payments has existed since th0 early 
1930's. In every instance, without ex-
ception, where a suit has beer| brought 
to compel payment of interest 
earnings on the investment of 
funds, the lending institution has not 
paid the mortgagor for the us^ of the im-
pound funds. Nor is there anywhere the 
slightest suggestion that the|Valley Na-
tional Bank or any lending institution 
ever paid for the use of impound funds. 
or the 
the impound 
While a few isolated in 
not prove a usage, one so fi 
lished for so many years nat 
be controlling. A usage will 
it is uniform, long establi 
well known that it can be sai 
parties contracted with re 
and the failure to conform to 
the exception. Cleveland etc 
stance 
rm 
es will 
ly estab-
i0nwide should 
be binding if 
, and so 
that the 
e to it 
it would be 
R.R. Co. v. 
shed 
ferenc 
Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 
is a usage invalid because itfe 
different from a general rule 
811. Nor 
effect is 
of law. 
It is well settled jthat a trade 
usage which is contrary to a statute 
or which contravenes public policy is 
invalid and may not be invoked; but 
where a rule of law is or a character 
that the parties may make it inappli-
cable to their contract by express 
agreement, they may likewise render 
it inapplicable by implied usage or 
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir.l 1936). 
I am therefore of the opinion that by 
banking usage neither interes 
on investment was expected to 
to the mortgagor. 
t nor earnings 
be credited 
A not-yet-reported decision ib Throp v. Bell 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Ill.App.Ct., Docket No. 
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on rehearing, 10-7-76. 
- 43c -
It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of 
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying 
"the use or non-use of the words 'in trifist1 is not the 
controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or 
has not been created." It is the most recent decision on 
the subject and contains a review of recent authorities 
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief. Its 
reasoning is applicable to appellants' simplistic argument 
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document. 
Finally, we cite the Report of Committee on Real 
I 
Estate Financing entitled "Class ActionB Under Antitrust 
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real 
Property Probate and Trust Journal of the American Bar 
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, 
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976. It concludes: 
If lenders begin to pay interest on 
escrow accounts, realistically the addi 
tional expenses that result wpLll in some 
manner be borne by borrowers 
a carrying charge or increase 
rates which would cover thesel 
In short the payment of interest on escrow 
accounts would not result in 
benefit to borrowers and would in all proba-
bility increase costs at leas| 
loans. 
^ither by 
in the loan 
expenses. 
|any economic 
t on smaller 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of November, 
1976, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief of Newly Uncovered Cases were delivered to Robert J. DeBry, 
attorney for plaintiffs, 2040 East 4800 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
